Venezuela is at a critical inflection point as 2018 begins, with its humanitarian crisis poised to deteriorate further, fomenting ongoing lawlessness and violence. There is widespread global concern about this crisis, evidenced by the United States’ and Europe’s decisions to impose sanctions on Venezuelan bonds and government officials, but the international community must do more. Now is the time to act to lessen the impact of a worsening crisis and potentially failed state.
Dr. Carlos E. Ponce, Latin American and Caribbean Director
Freedom House
2017 Recap
During the final months of 2017, unrest rose sharply in Venezuela, spurred by acute food and medicine shortages; unreliable access to water, electricity, and health care; rampant crime; and major human rights violations. Venezuela ended 2017 in default as inflation soared to 2,735 percent, GDP contracted by 14.7 percent, and monthly minimum salaries plummeted to less than US $3 per month – an economic crisis that has compounded the ongoing human rights and humanitarian emergency.
Inefficiency has driven the state-run oil company to reduce oil production by more than 1.2 million barrels per day, forcing the government to import gasoline to satisfy domestic demand and signaling bleak prospects for economic recovery in 2018. The appointment of a corrupt National Guard General at the national Oil Industry PDVSA has made production challenges worse and increased the possibility of an oil strike.
In the midst of political and economic turmoil, illegal groups and corrupt officials co-opted the Venezuelan banking system and oil industry as vehicles for drug trafficking, mafia operations, and money laundering, with a reach far beyond Venezuelan borders. By some estimates, corrupt Venezuelan officials and their frontmen throughout the region have laundered roughly $700 billion.
Moreover, violent political demonstrations battered Venezuela in 2017, resulting in more than 120 deaths and thousands arrests of demonstrators and opposition leaders. More than 240 people remain in prison. Throughout much of last year, the Maduro regime successfully mollified unrest in some of the country’s poorest regions with false promises of improved social programs.
Rising tensions by the year’s end, however, augur a less tractable public and heightened violent resistance. For instance, the December 31 killing by a National Guardsman of a poor pregnant woman protesting in a long line for food sparked unprecedented outrage in one of Caracas’ poorest neighborhoods.
Outlook for Early 2018
After 17 years, the Chavez Revolution has brought Venezuela violence, inefficiency, poverty, and gross abuses of power, which become ever more challenging to address. The coming weeks will bring an exponential rise in sporadic demonstrations, mob violence, riots, and looting in poor neighborhoods. Localized violence will likely spread quickly to the national level. The regime will respond with additional arbitrary detentions of people demanding access to basic necessities, which will foment a new wave of massive and violent demonstrations.
An estimated 2.5 million people have emigrated from Venezuela over the past five years, most of them middle class professionals. This year, increased desperation will drive even the poorest Venezuelans to seek relief outside of Venezuela. Migrants will flood borders with Brazil, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago, generating a humanitarian migratory crisis for which the region is poorly prepared.
Without a more coherent, credible, and inclusive opposition party, little will improve on the political front in 2018. The Mesa de Unidad Democratica (MUD), which represents the “formal”opposition is an electoral platform rather than an opposition movement. It is a collection of relatively weak political parties and lacks key representation from labor unions, civil society, the private sector, and other entities that oppose the Maduro regime. While the MUD has been effective in winning some elections, like the parliamentary election in 2015, it has failed to design and implement an effective opposition strategy to combat the dictatorial regime. Moreover, some MUD members have colluded on corruption inside the regime, further damaging the platform’s credibility and cohesion. So far, the MUD’s only strategy has been to engage in a series ineffective dialogues, while the regime has continued to tighten its grip on power. In 2018, the MUD will champion a presidential election as the only viable alternative and will put forth a single opposition candidate. Yet, the Maduro regime has proven itself adroit at manipulating the opposition with small electoral concessions, while maintaining control of the electoral process itself. Unless the opposition can organize, Venezuela will remain a country with a drug-cartel in control and an opposition too weak and divided to fight alone with the scarce democratic tools remaining.
Now is the time to act if the international community is interested in helping prevent the crisis in Venezuela from worsening. If implemented, the recommendations below could force the regime into a true negotiation that brings actual relief to the Venezuelan people.
Policy Recommendations:
· Increase direct pressure on Maduro and his cronies.
During the final months of 2017, unrest rose sharply in Venezuela, spurred by acute food and medicine shortages; unreliable access to water, electricity, and health care; rampant crime; and major human rights violations. Venezuela ended 2017 in default as inflation soared to 2,735 percent, GDP contracted by 14.7 percent, and monthly minimum salaries plummeted to less than US $3 per month – an economic crisis that has compounded the ongoing human rights and humanitarian emergency.
Inefficiency has driven the state-run oil company to reduce oil production by more than 1.2 million barrels per day, forcing the government to import gasoline to satisfy domestic demand and signaling bleak prospects for economic recovery in 2018. The appointment of a corrupt National Guard General at the national Oil Industry PDVSA has made production challenges worse and increased the possibility of an oil strike.
In the midst of political and economic turmoil, illegal groups and corrupt officials co-opted the Venezuelan banking system and oil industry as vehicles for drug trafficking, mafia operations, and money laundering, with a reach far beyond Venezuelan borders. By some estimates, corrupt Venezuelan officials and their frontmen throughout the region have laundered roughly $700 billion.
Moreover, violent political demonstrations battered Venezuela in 2017, resulting in more than 120 deaths and thousands arrests of demonstrators and opposition leaders. More than 240 people remain in prison. Throughout much of last year, the Maduro regime successfully mollified unrest in some of the country’s poorest regions with false promises of improved social programs.
Rising tensions by the year’s end, however, augur a less tractable public and heightened violent resistance. For instance, the December 31 killing by a National Guardsman of a poor pregnant woman protesting in a long line for food sparked unprecedented outrage in one of Caracas’ poorest neighborhoods.
Outlook for Early 2018
After 17 years, the Chavez Revolution has brought Venezuela violence, inefficiency, poverty, and gross abuses of power, which become ever more challenging to address. The coming weeks will bring an exponential rise in sporadic demonstrations, mob violence, riots, and looting in poor neighborhoods. Localized violence will likely spread quickly to the national level. The regime will respond with additional arbitrary detentions of people demanding access to basic necessities, which will foment a new wave of massive and violent demonstrations.
An estimated 2.5 million people have emigrated from Venezuela over the past five years, most of them middle class professionals. This year, increased desperation will drive even the poorest Venezuelans to seek relief outside of Venezuela. Migrants will flood borders with Brazil, Colombia, and Trinidad and Tobago, generating a humanitarian migratory crisis for which the region is poorly prepared.
Without a more coherent, credible, and inclusive opposition party, little will improve on the political front in 2018. The Mesa de Unidad Democratica (MUD), which represents the “formal”opposition is an electoral platform rather than an opposition movement. It is a collection of relatively weak political parties and lacks key representation from labor unions, civil society, the private sector, and other entities that oppose the Maduro regime. While the MUD has been effective in winning some elections, like the parliamentary election in 2015, it has failed to design and implement an effective opposition strategy to combat the dictatorial regime. Moreover, some MUD members have colluded on corruption inside the regime, further damaging the platform’s credibility and cohesion. So far, the MUD’s only strategy has been to engage in a series ineffective dialogues, while the regime has continued to tighten its grip on power. In 2018, the MUD will champion a presidential election as the only viable alternative and will put forth a single opposition candidate. Yet, the Maduro regime has proven itself adroit at manipulating the opposition with small electoral concessions, while maintaining control of the electoral process itself. Unless the opposition can organize, Venezuela will remain a country with a drug-cartel in control and an opposition too weak and divided to fight alone with the scarce democratic tools remaining.
Now is the time to act if the international community is interested in helping prevent the crisis in Venezuela from worsening. If implemented, the recommendations below could force the regime into a true negotiation that brings actual relief to the Venezuelan people.
Policy Recommendations:
· Increase direct pressure on Maduro and his cronies.
- Individual sanctions have been effective against Maduro’s regime and its allies. Additional sanctions from a greater number of countries will continue to build pressure on the regime and its corrupt, criminal affiliates.
- An international no-fly restriction for Maduro and his officials would further increase pressure.
- The international community should seek the initiation of formal criminal cases against Maduro, his ministers, and his generals for their active participation in drug trafficking. The U.S. Department of Justice should open a case against Maduro in a federal U.S. court and other countries should do the same in their respective court systems.
- A state party to the Rome Statute should bring the Venezuelan government’s systematic crimes against the humanity to the International Criminal Court’s Prosecutor for immediate investigation.
- In discussions of a negotiated solution for Venezuela, the international community should prioritize forcing a negotiation that will mitigate the humanitarian crisis over pushing for a transitional government.
- The United Nations should increase pressure on Venezuela. The US should request an emergency meeting at the UN Security Council, and an international monitor, such as a Special Envoy for Venezuela, should be designated to monitor corruption, handle negotiations, and recommend a transitional justice process.
- The international community should develop strategies to prosecute corrupt Venezuelan officials, their business partners, and front men, and recover the billions of laundered dollars. Recovered money should be placed in a special fund for the reconstruction of Venezuela.
- The international community should not recognize any elections in Venezuela without a total change in the independence of the electoral authority and electoral process or without independent international election monitoring.
- No humanitarian aid should be given without first commencing firm negotiations to address political and economic changes – the regime will use any food aid for political purposes.
- The international community should prioritize person-to-person humanitarian support, including a more active role for the Venezuelan diaspora. Broader humanitarian efforts can be easily manipulated by the Maduro regime.
- China and Russia keeps selling weapons to the dictatorship to control street demonstrations. Other countries sell weapons to the Venezuelan military and those weapons ended in the hands of illegal groups or used against civilians. A total ban to sale or to transport weapons to Venezuela is necessary.
- The Venezuelan opposition needs to find a common ground among a depleted MUD, other internal opposition movements, student groups, labor unions, and the diaspora. The international community has an important role to play in supporting a coherent opposition movement that goes beyond an electoral platform.
- Major support to investigative and independent journalists must be part of any aid to Venezuela. The international community should implement programs to support printed newspapers and other media that are still operating completely alone – they are the last hope of accurate, independent information on the situation in Venezuela.
- International legislative bodies including the US Congress should hold hearings on a potential transition of power in Venezuela.
- The US Southern Command should coordinate with security forces in neighboring countries to address the potential power vacuum if Venezuela becomes a failed state. Illegal armed groups, cartels, and guerrillas will exploit this vacuum as they gain strength and raise the specter of increased transnational crime.
- The international community should develop a reconstruction and humanitarian plan to fill the vacuum if the regime falls.
- The UNHCR and the governments of Colombia, Brazil, Curacao and Trinidad, as well as other neighboring countries, must prepare for a Venezuelan refugee crisis and develop a Venezuelan Refugee Assistant Project.
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