Venezuela: Edmundo in Wonderland

 

By Dr. Carlos E. Ponce. Adjunct Professor Boston University, Northeastern University, John Hopkins University, and Framingham State University

It’s good to have hope, especially when one lives in the misery of a sadistic and corrupt dictatorship, but one has to be clear about the scenarios of a possible transition in Venezuela, and those scenarios are quite complicated. Venezuelans must be clear that these have been 25 years of a dictatorship, now in the hands of Nicolás Maduro, who has shown himself to be ruthless, who has become accustomed to deceiving and manipulating; and where illegality, fraud, corruption, and the lack of any point of decency or respect for human beings prevail.

There is an opportunity for change in Venezuela, but it could be very complicated. The regime is up against the current; a growing dissent with rejection numbers close to 85% of the population (who want a political change) and a voting intention of 75% of the population, an internal struggle between factors of the Chavismo-Madurismo that has led to the imprisonment of one of its main economic operators, an international illegitimacy that is already undermining the support even of traditional allies, and a dollarized economic crisis that prevents printing money and its’ economic allies such as China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey in crisis. The illegal exchange operations were managed by Maduro's former Vice President and former President of the Venezuelan oil company Tareck El Aissami, who is now imprisoned by the regime. This reduces the effectiveness of Maduro and his accomplices. A group in power haunted by the ghosts of the chaos they have created, and as a corollary, a case against Maduro that continues to advance in the International Criminal Court.

But at the same time, it is the same regime that for 25 years has carried out massive fraud, controls all the institutions, manages a complicit justice system that violates human rights, tortures, persecutes, and manipulates. It is the same regime that has been using violence, police, and military control to stay in power. It is not a government with an authoritarian tendency, it is a brutal dictatorship that has found it convenient to give the illusion that there is some form of popular model of government. It is an electoral power that continues to show partiality and a lack of any possibility of independence or decency. There is a flawed and unaudited electoral roll of supposedly 22 million voters, in a country of 28 million inhabitants developed during the presidency of Hugo Chávez and then by Nicolas Maduro. If the dead and false votes created at the whim of the regime and the more than 8 million Venezuelans who have left the country (5 million voters) were removed from this electoral registry, there would be a real number of potential voters of 11 million. The math does not lie, of the 8 million who have left they only allowed 69,189 to be updated. Of the 2.5 million new voters who should have entered the system only 30% were registered, plus a mortality rate of 8%, which reduces real voters by 200,000 per year, the regime has more than 11 million non-existent voters, including those who will not be able to vote from abroad. There is an unverified or audited electronic system that manages votes at will. 1,700 new fictitious polling stations, itinerant polling stations, and other ghost centers have been created in the 25 years of dictatorship. Everything points to mega-fraud in July by Nicolas Maduro.

The first scenario for July 28 is clear, a regime that will lose its life if it hands over power due to countless illegalities and its alliances with organized crime will do everything possible to preserve power. Maduro and his accomplices are going to hinder the opposition campaign (as they have been doing), and they are going to commit fraud. With all the elements in hand for fraud, it is a regime that can seek to distribute ghost votes among the paid opponents (known as scorpions) and claim a minimum majority to “defeat” the opposition candidate Edmundo González. Concurrently, the paid “opposition” candidates will validate the fraud.

Other variants of this scenario could be inventing cases of corruption against the majority opposition candidate or a strategy of massive repression that prevents the vote. From the disruptive scenarios of the regime, an alleged conflict with Guyana may arise to restrict mobility and declare the suspension of the elections. And precisely this suspension would be similar to the situation in Nicaragua, but the difference is that in Nicaragua a single family governs, and in Venezuela, the corrupt government and their economic allies like the good life, and an international fence does not go well for them. The militarization of the border with Guyana and the construction of Venezuela's infrastructure in the Reclamation Zone to provoke Guyana and the international community is not good news and reflects the regime's interest in militarizing the country and thus avoiding social protests due to fraud.

The other scenario, the fantasy or wonderland, one millions of Venezuelans dream of, is the possibility of getting out of the nightmare of 25 years of inefficient, corrupt, and criminal dictatorship. Yes, all the polls indeed show the opposition candidate with broad favoritism of the vote of more than 60% of the population. If these were “normal” circumstances, there would be no doubt about the opposition's victory, but of course, this is not the case in Venezuela. It's a solid probability. Hope and positivity are important, but not in excess because the complicated route ahead requires sacrifices; not triumphalism.

For there to be regime changes and transitions after authoritarianism, there must be strong and coordinated social movements that put pressure on the regime from the base, opposition forces that coordinate efforts to achieve unitary containment platforms, a trigger of force that raises the cost to the regime, and the internal fracture of the power group that allows negotiations with more democratic elements of the regime for a transition. Without these conditions, there is no transition, except by force, and that is not a possible case in Venezuela.

The strength that María Corina Machado has shown in the street, with a massive national mobilization, is similar to what allowed Democratic Action to access the power that the dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez possessed, similar to the mobilization that Hugo Chávez achieved at the time. The regime's mistake of prohibiting her from leaving the country and prohibiting her from flying in Venezuela forced her to a street campaign, which has been impossible for the regime to stop. Machado's disqualification also did not prevent an electoral survival strategy from the opposition parties, which found an unknown candidate, Edmundo González, as an alternative that went unnoticed by the regime. Machado takes a stance similar to that of Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma/Myanmar who in 2006 stepped aside from the presidential campaign so she could defeat the military junta when it was disqualified. Their mobilization for July 28 must also continue for the 2025 elections, and in case of massive fraud, to pressure for change. We already know that hope without strategy is an illusion.

The electoral fraud scenario could be similar to what Peru experienced with the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori where the electoral body (ONPE) was at the service of the autocrat and committed massive fraud where there were more votes than voters. The international community denounced the fraud and the opposition began social mobilizations throughout the country, including the so-called “March of the 4 Suyos,” which led many supporters of the Fujimori government to resign and join the protests. Fujimori, on a trip to Japan, decided to stay and the transition began.

An important factor that must occur is to create incentives for a transition so that it is possible for the members of the group in power to think about their survival with a political change in Venezuela. If those in power with Maduro think that their future is prison or exile, they will not facilitate a transition and without them, it would be an almost impossible scenario. After 25 years of experiencing persecution and tragedy, it is hard to think of spaces for dialogue and co-existence with criminals, and it is natural that many of us want to see those who persecuted us imprisoned, but to avoid additional years in this plight that has driven more than 8 million people to escape, it is worth a mental reframe. 

If the wonderland scenario occurs, Edmundo Gonzalez as president could be key in an inclusive transitional government that leads to constitutional reform, institutional transformation, and a unity government that leads the transition to a livable country. But, there is still a lot to be done, and it requires a lot of commitment and effort; not just hope and dreams.